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Two MindsAbstract
Decision-making and action selection are mental activities for shaping and organizing human
behavior in the ever-changing environment. There are, however, important differences
between decision-making and action selection. According to ‘‘Two Minds’’ (Evans & Frankish,
2009; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, 2011) – a version of dual processing theory – human behav-
ior can be viewed as the integration of output of System 1, i.e., unconscious automatic pro-
cesses, and System 2, i.e., conscious deliberate processes. System 1 activates a sequence of
automatic actions. System 2 monitors System 1’s performance according to the plan it has cre-
ated and, at the same time, it activates future possible courses of actions. Decision-making
narrowly refers to System 2’s slow functions for planning for the future and related deliberate
activities, e.g., monitoring, for future planning. On the other hand, action selection refers to
integrated activities including not only System 1’s fast activities but also System 2’s slow activ-
ities, not separately but integrally. This paper further discusses the difference between deci-
sion-making and action selection on the basis of the architecture model the authors have
developed for simulating human beings’ in situ action selection, Model Human Processor with
Realtime Constraints (MHP/RT) (Kitajima & Toyota, 2012b). MHP/RT’s simulation of human
behavior along the time dimension shows when the processes of decision-making and action
selection would be initiated and how they are carried out.
ª 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.2a).
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This paper discusses the differences and the interrelation-
ships between decision-making and action selection based
on the cognitive architecture, MHP/RT,1 that outputs mo-
ment-by-moment human beings’ action selections by deal-
ing with continuous input from the ever-changing
environment (Kitajima & Toyota, 2012b). The function of
MHP/RT is analogous to an operating system for modern
computers. MHP/RT is equipped with several modules that
work autonomously and synchronize with each other when
necessary. The modules include a module for processing in-
put from the external environment, a module for transmit-
ting the results of the processing to the external
environment, and a module of memories for short-term
storage of input information, for long-term storage of infor-
mation for future use, and for momentary maintenance of
information for the internal processes. Operating systems
for computers are for appropriately dealing with any input
to the computers at any time T without having the comput-
ers halt unless it is ordered to do so or some modules make
fatal errors. MHP/RT is for appropriately dealing with any
input from the external ever-changing environment and
internally generated input at any time T to make decisions
and action selections that should cause some changes in
the environment. The decisions and action selections at
each moment should have influence on decisions and action
selections thereafter as well.
1.1. Requirement of a cognitive architecture
In general, a cognitive architecture is for specifying ‘‘how
the mind will do.’’ The following quotation is from Allen
Newell’s lecture at Carnegie Mellon University, December
4, 1991 (adapted from Anderson (2007, pp. 3–4)):
The question for me is, how can the human mind occur in
the physical universe? We now know that the world is
governed by physics. We now understand the way biology
nestles comfortably within that. The issue is, how will
the mind do that as well? The answer must have the
details. I have got to know how the gears clank and
how the pistons go and all the rest of that detail. My
question leads me down to worry about the architecture.
In order to address the ‘‘how the mind will do’’ question,
a cognitive architecture needs to place a special emphasis
on the nature of strong interactions between the internal
human mind and the external environment. In other words,
it needs to deal with what we observe in the external envi-
ronment as the results of human beings’ action selections in
relation with the time dimension T. Observable human
behaviors in the external environment are equivalent to a
series of moment-by-moment behaviors along the time
dimension with appropriate grain sizes of time. Considering
that human beings’ behaviors are strongly coupled with the
external environment, and since the external environment,1 MHP/RT is the acronym for Model Human Processor with
Realtime Constraints.i.e., physical or physiological, develops as a function of
time T, human beings’ behaviors need to be treated as a
function of T as well. In summary, the top-level require-
ment of a cognitive architecture is to provide a substratum
for simulating moment-by-moment human beings’ behaviors
in the ever-changing environment.
Specific grain sizes of time for describing moment-by-
moment human behaviors along the time dimension might
be arbitrary. However, as (Newell, 1990, p. 122) suggested,
there are a number of characteristic times useful for consid-
ering human beings’ behaviors: each is associated with one
of distinctive ‘‘bands’’ connected non-linearly with each
other as shown in Table 1. This has an important implication
to the design of scientific researches towards understanding
human being’s behavior, i.e., it is not wise to understand
phenomena in a higher band by extrapolating findings in
the lower bands.
1.2. Outline of the paper
MHP/RT is a cognitive architecture with T as its critical
dimension that builds on the important findings in behav-
ioral economics, one major trends of economics, which sug-
gests that ‘‘the mind’’ should consist of two totally
different systems, called Two Minds (Kahneman, 2003). Sys-
tem 1 deals with intuitive decisions (action selection, in this
paper), and System 2 takes care of deliberate, effort con-
suming processing such as reasoning (decision-making, in
this paper). However, most phenomena the economics
treats are not severely sensitive to the time dimension.
This paper starts by describing a cognitive architecture
built on Two Minds with the consideration of how to syn-
chronize ‘‘very fast’’ System 1 and ‘‘super slow’’ System
2 in the ever-changing environment for the purpose of cre-
ating coherent moment-by-moment behavior. This paper
suggests that decision-making is relevant with System 2
and action planning is relevant with System 1. The function
of decision making and that of action selection are the same
at the point that they both deal with the future of the
behaving system but they are different in terms of their
characteristic processing times, and therefore each should
function at different timings, and interacts with each other
appropriately as the time goes by. This paper shows that
memory system locates at the central of the entire
processes.2
1.3. Current status of MHP/RT
At present, MHP/RT is not a running computational model
but a conceptual simulation model that helps designing eth-
nographic field studies for understanding people’s in situ
decision making and action selection processes. We have
developed a methodology, called Cognitive Chrono-Ethnog-
raphy which includes a process to simulate people’s behav-
ior in question by MHP/RT. Kitajima and Toyota (2012b)2 In this sense, MHP/RT can be regarded as ‘‘TwoMinds(T)’’, a real
brain model that shows Two Minds’ features along the time
dimension T with the boundary conditions being defined by the
performances of the memory systems.
Table 1 Newell’s time scale of human action. adapted
from Newell (1990, p. 122), Fig. 3-3.
Scale (s) Time units System World (theory)
107 months Social band
106 weeks
105 days
104 h Task Rational band
103 10min Task
102 min Task
101 10 s Unit task Cognitive band
100 1 s Operations
101 100 ms Delibate act
102 10 ms Neural circuit Biological band
103 1 ms Neuron
104 100 lms Organelle
84 M. Kitajima, M. Toyotaidentifies cognitive functions, i.e., attention, planning, and
working memory, that should affect the performance of el-
derly passengers’ signage following behavior at railway sta-
tions by performing qualitative simulation of MHP/RT. The
simulation predicted that those elderly passengers with
the inferior attention function would behave differently
from those with normal cognitive functions. A field study
was designed after the predictions of MHP/RT simulations
and the results of field observations confirmed that the el-
derly passengers’ behaviors were well characterized by
the workings of the identified cognitive functions, and pro-
vided deeper understandings for the relationships between
the observed behaviors of the elderly passengers and the
workings of the cognitive functions. We have conducted a
set of CCE studies; Kitajima, Tahira, Takahashi, and Mido-
rikawa (2012) studied how visitors to a hot spring resort en-
joy their visits, Kitajima (2012a) studied how spectators
visiting a baseball stadium had become loyal fans of a pro-
fessional baseball team in Japan, and so on.
We have finished the construction of the comprehensive
brain activity model that is capable of qualitatively simulat-
ing human beings’ daily decision making and action selec-
tions, and we have just started to verify it by a series of
CCE studies; they used MHP/RT for designing the studies
and the observations were consistent with the MHP/RT’s
predictions. There are a variety of directions to proceed,
e.g., constructing running computational simulation mod-
els, but, for the time being, we will continue on the same
line we have been taking, i.e., conducting CCE studies to
accumulate cases that are explained by Two Minds and
understood mechanistically and deeper by MHP/RT.
The main focus of this paper is the cognitive architecture
of MHP/RT but equally important is the role of memory that
is used in decision making and action selections. In fact,
what determines the content of decision-making and action
selections is strongly related with the active part of memory
at a specific moment. As to the former, i.e., the role of
memory in MHP/RT (Kitajima & Toyota, 2012c) will be de-
scribed in this paper. As to the latter, i.e., the content of
memory and how it develops from scratch, its theorization
is underway and we are planning to publish it in the near
future.2. Understanding people’s behavior along the
time dimension T
2.1. Two Minds
‘‘Understanding people’s behavior’’ is an important study
issue in economics. How does a person decide to purchase
a new commodity for daily use? He or she selects one from
a number of candidates in order to realize the states where
he/she wants to be. Human decision-making underlies these
activities, and therefore it has been a central topic in eco-
nomics to be studied extensively. Herbert A. Simon, winner
of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1978, proposed principles
of human beings’ decision-making processes. He described
the decision-making process as a ‘‘bounded rationality prin-
ciple’’ as well as a ‘‘satisficing principle’’ (Simon, 1956; Si-
mon, 1996). Simon claimed that agents, or human beings,
face uncertainty about the future and cost when acquiring
information in the present. These factors limit the extent
to which human beings can make a fully rational decision.
Thus, they possess only ‘‘bounded rationality’’ and must
make decisions by ‘‘satisficing,’’ or choosing the path that
might not be optimal, but which will make them happy
enough.
Recently, Kahneman, winner of the Nobel Prize in eco-
nomics in 2002, introduced behavioral economics, which
stems from the claim that decision-making is governed by
the so-called ‘‘Two Minds’’ (Evans & Frankish, 2009; Kahn-
eman, 2003; Kahneman, 2011), a version of dual processing
theory, consisting of System 1 and System 2. Fig. 1 (adapted
from Kahneman (2003)) illustrates the workings of the two
systems. System 1, the first type of process, is a fast feed-
forward control process driven by the cerebellum and ori-
ented toward immediate action. Experiential processing is
experienced passively, outside of conscious awareness
(one is seized by one’s emotions). In contrast, System 2,
the second type of process, is a slow feedback control pro-
cess driven by the cerebrum and oriented toward future ac-
tion. It is experienced actively and consciously (one
intentionally follows the rules of inductive and deductive
reasoning).2.2. Decision-making and action selection
Two Minds is naturally mapped onto two mental activities of
the main topic of this paper, i.e., decision-making and ac-
tion selection, that lead to moment-by-moment observable
behaviors. Decision-making is the act or process of choosing
a preferred option or course of actions from a set of alter-
natives. It precedes and underpins almost all deliberate or
voluntary behavior. Action selection is the process for
selecting ‘‘what to do next’’ in dynamic and unpredictable
environments in real time. The outcome of decision-making
is regarded as part of resources that are available when
selecting actions (Suchman, 1987). As dual-processing theo-
ries suggest, e.g., Kahneman (2003), two qualitatively dif-
ferent mechanisms of information processing operate in
forming decisions. The first is a quick and easy processing
mode based on effort-conserving heuristics. The second is
a slow and more difficult rule-based processing mode based
Decision-making and action selection in Two Minds: An analysis based on Model 85on effort-consuming systematic reasoning. The first type of
process, action selection, is often unconscious and tends to
automatic processing carried out by System 1 of Two Minds,
whereas the second, decision-making is invariably conscious
and usually involves controlled processing carried out by
System 2 of Two Minds.
2.3. Hierarchical structure of behavior
Observed behavior should be regarded as a compound of
activities that occur on different time scales. The time
scales may be milliseconds, hundreds of milliseconds, a
few minutes, or even a few weeks. It is not appropriate to
consider that activities that occur on a certain time scale
evolve continuously to the next higher time scale. Rather,
it is more appropriate to assume that a set of activities that
occur on a certain time scale are discontinuously connected
with higher-level activities, and therefore the relationship
between a pair of related activities at two different levels
is non-linear.
Newell (1990) explained the time scale of human action,
and identified four bands and their characteristic times: the
biological band (1–10 ms), the cognitive band (100 ms to
10 s), the rational band (a few minutes to a few hours),
and the social band (a few hours to months). It is important
to consider appropriately which band is dominant when
examining people’s behavior. Phenomena governed mainly
by consciousness, or System 2, would be considered in ra-
tional, social, or cognitive band, whereas those controlled
mainly by unconsciousness, or System 1, would be consid-
ered in cognitive or biological band. Note that the cognitive
band would reside both processes.
In summary, decision-making is associated with the
activities of System 2 working in rational, social, or cogni-
tive band, and action selection is associated with the activ-
ities of System 1 working in cognitive or biological band, and
both are non-linearly connected to exhibit moment-by-mo-
ment observable behaviors in the ever-changing external
environment. The question is how System 1 activities,
including action selection, and System 2 activities, including
decision-making, interrelate with each other. This paper ad-Fig. 1 Two Minds (adapteddresses this issue by using the cognitive architecture, MHP/
RT.
2.4. Decision-making and action selection in Two
Minds: An illustration
Here is an example to illustrate the point.
When you hear the car-navigation system start speaking
in synthesized voice, you switch your attention to listening
to what it says and try to comprehend it for planning your
driving for the near future. The navigation system is de-
signed to speak, for example, ‘‘Slight right turn in point five
miles on South Lynn Street’’ with the screen shown in Fig. 2
at some specific moment.
A driver, who is not familiar with the route, is supposed to
listen to the instruction and read the screen consciously and
carefully, and integrate the provided information from the
car-navigation system with the current driving situation for
imagining and planning the immediate future driving and cre-
ating automatically executable action sequences for the
maneuver; when to start reducing speed, when to start brak-
ing, and so forth. These activities are carried out by System 2.
When the navigation system starts speaking at time T
‘‘Slight right turn . . . ’’, it should intervene the driver’s
on-going processes carried out under System 1 and/or Sys-
tem 2 and initiates a new interactive process stream on
the part of the driver. This process should interact with
whatever Two Minds processes the driver engages in. The
newly initiated process might negatively interfere with or
positively enhance the other on-going processes; some pro-
cesses must be suspended and resumed at a proper timing
with little cost, and the other processes should continue
with no interference from the car-navigation system, e.g.,
keep conversing with a person in the passenger seat.
After completing the instruction, the driver would be
able to comprehend the meaning of rather ambiguous con-
cept ‘‘slight right turn’’ by integrating it with what the dri-
ver has just seen, i.e., the real road scene, deliberately by
using System 2. This knowledge might be useful for the dri-
ver to predict what would happen when he/she is given an-
other version of the instruction ‘‘Slight right turn in    onfrom Kahneman (2003)).
Fig. 2 Screenshot from a car-navigation system.
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tem 2 would be carried out while driving on the street by
using System 1. In addition, the driver would learn the spe-
cific procedures associated with this turn, e.g., where to
look at for safety driving, how to enter the street, etc. by
using System 1. In summary, at each moment, the driver
would use System 2 for future planning or reflect on the
experience, or use System 1 for on-going driving or integrat-
ing the just-completed behavior with the learnt procedure.
3. MHP/RT: cognitive architecture for
simulating people’s behavior
Kitajima and Toyota (2012b) proposed MHP/RT as a simula-
tion model of human behavior selection as shown in Fig. 3. It
stems from the successful simulation model of human infor-
mation processing, Model Human Processor (MHP) proposed
by Card, Moran, and Newell (1983), and extends it by incor-
porating three theories we have published in the cognitive
sciences community. The Maximum Satisfaction Architec-
ture (MSA) deals with coordination of behavioral goals (Kit-
ajima, Shimada, & Toyota, 2007), the Structured Meme
Theory (SMT) involves utilization of long-term memory,
which works as an autonomous system (Toyota, Kitajima,
& Shimada, 2008), and Brain Information Hydrodynamics
(BIH) involves a mechanism for synchronizing the individual
with the environment (Kitajima, Toyota, & Shimada, 2008).
MHP/RT includes a mechanism for synchronizing autono-
mous systems (rectangles with rounded corners in Fig. 3),
working in the ‘‘Synchronous Band.’’ MHP/RT was created
by combining MHP (Card et al., 1983) and Two Minds (Kahn-
eman, 2011; Kahneman, 2003) by applying the conceptual
framework of Organic Self-Consistent Field Theory (Toyota
& Kitajima, 2010). See Kitajima (2012b) for more
information.
3.1. MHP/RT works as a function of time T
MHP/RT is a real brain model comprising of System 1’s
unconscious processes and System 2’s conscious processes
at the same level as shown in Fig. 3, in which both System
1 and System 2 receive input from the Perceptual Informa-
tion Processing System in one way, and from the Memory
Processing System in another way. System 1 and System 2
work autonomously without any superordinate-subordinate
hierarchical relationships but interact with each other when
necessary.This feature of MHP/RT should be contrasted with the
goal-oriented cognitive architectures such as ACT-R (Ander-
son & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson, 2007) in which the conscious
processes are considered as the processes to control peo-
ple’s behavior and the unconscious processes are considered
subordinate to the conscious or intentional processes. What
ACT-R tries to do is to show how System 2 can be imple-
mented on top of System 1. The procedural memory system
is very similar to System 1 (fast, learning based on rewards/
experience, intuitive), and then ACT-R models tend to con-
sist of a set of production rules that (when run on this Sys-
tem 1 module and in combination with symbolic working
memory buffers and a long-term memory system) give rise
to the slower, deliberative planning behaviors seen in Sys-
tem 2. This is a very different approach to that given in this
paper. However, ACT-R models are totally adequate for sim-
ulating stable human activities with weak time constraint in
which deliberate decision making would work effectively,
but might be hard for the situations with strong time con-
straint where the environmental condition changes chaoti-
cally and deliberate decision making implemented on
System 2 might not work as effective.
3.1.1. MHP/RT’s basic flow
As depicted in Fig. 3, MHP/RT operates in two bands, the
asynchronous band and the synchronous band. The Bodily
Coordination Monitoring System and the Memory Processing
System operate in the asynchronous band. The Perceptual
Information Processing System, Conscious Information Pro-
cessing System, Autonomous Automatic Behavior Control
Processing System, and Behavioral Action Processing System
operate in the synchronous band. These systems work
autonomously. System 1 of the Two Minds corresponds to
the Autonomous Automatic Behavior Control Processing Sys-
tem, and System 2 corresponds to the Conscious Information
Processing System.
MHP/RT works as follows (Fig. 4):
1. Inputting information from the environment and the
individual.
2. Building a cognitive frame in working memory, which
resides between the conscious process, System 2, and
the unconscious process, System 1, to interface them –
depicted between System 1 and System 2.
3. Resonating the cognitive frame with autonomous long-
term memory to make available the relevant information
stored in long-term memory; cognitive frames are
updated at a certain rate and the contents in the cogni-
tive frames are continuously input to long-term memory
to make pieces of information in long-term memory
accessible to System 1 and System 2.
4. Mapping the results of resonance on consciousness to
form a reduced representation of the input information,
and
5. Predicting future cognitive frames to coordinate input and
working memory, corresponding to either decision-making
or action selection depending on the time difference
between the timewhen theprediction ismadeand the time
when an event associated with the prediction happens,
namely, whether the prediction is made mainly by System
2, decision-making, or by System 1, action selection.
Fig. 3 Schematic diagram of MHP/RT (adapted from Kitajima and Toyota (2012b)).
Fig. 4 MHP/RT (adapted from Kitajima and Toyota (2012b)).
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product of the updating rate of the cognitive frame and
the degree of fineness of the information represented in
the cognitive frame. When the system is under the control
of automatic behavior, i.e., under control of System 1,the updating rate of the cognitive frame tends to be high;
however, the degree of fineness of the information repre-
sented in the cognitive frame is coarse. When the system
is under the control of consciousness, i.e., under control
of System 2, the updating rate of the cognitive frame and
88 M. Kitajima, M. Toyotathe degree of fineness of the information are flexibly deter-
mined by the context.
3.2. Basic MHP/RT behaviors
At a given time, T, MHP/RT’s state is viewed by two ways;
1. which part of MHP/RT is working, and
2. which content MHP/RT is processing
In the following subsections, the ‘‘which part’’ question
will be decried in 3.2.1, the ‘‘Four Operation Modes’’ sub-
section (Kitajima & Toyota, 2012b), and the ‘‘for what’’
question in 3.2.2, the ‘‘Four Processing Modes’’ subsection
(Kitajima & Toyota, 2011a).
3.2.1. Four operation modes of MHP/RT
At a given time, T, MHP/RT’s state is considered from the
viewpoint ‘‘which part of MHP/RT is working.’’ In MHP/RT
as illustrated by Fig. 4, behavior is the outcome of activities
in System 1 and System 2 both of which use working memory
to prepare for the next action. Depending on the situation,
behavior is driven mainly by either System 1 or System 2.
Both systems work synchronously by sharing working mem-
ory. The former is called Mode 1, and the latter, Mode 2.
However, in some situations, both work asynchronously,
Mode 3, or independently, Mode 4; working memory may
be shared weakly or used solely for one of these layers
(see Table 2).
 Mode 1 (System 1 controls behavior):When System 1 gov-
erns behavior, the updating rate of the cognitive frame is
the fastest, and the system behaves unconsciously. The
system refers to the memory that is activated via the res-
onance reaction, and the outcome of behavior is con-
sciously monitored, which is System 2’s mission in this
mode. As long as the output of behavior is consistent with
the representation of the contents of activated memory,
or prediction, no feedback control is applied. No serious
decision-making is required but a series of unconscious
action selections would result in smooth behavior. An
example of this behavior mode is riding a bicycle on a
familiar road.Table 2 Four operation modes of MHP/RT and their relationship
Synchronous mode
Mode 1: System 1 controls behavior Skille
decis
of be
chang
can b
Mode 2: System 2 controls behavior Unski
of ser
Asynchronous mode
Mode 3: System 1 and System 2 are weakly coupled Conce
easy
Mode 4: System 1 and System 2 are isolated Un-co
Time Mode 3 (System 1 and System 2 are weakly coupled): In
some cases, it is not necessary to monitor the behavior
with high frequency. As a result, System 2 may initiate
tasks that are not directly relevant to unconscious behav-
ior. In such a situation, consciousness is free from behav-
ior that is tightly embedded in the environment. For
example, while waiting for his/her name called in a lobby
of a hospital, he/she may read a book. In this case, at the
time when his/her name is called, he/she would be able
to stand up immediately to start walking to the consulta-
tion room. In his/her working memory, the pointer to the
action would be kept active while reading a book and
waiting for the announcement. This mode is character-
ized by weak coupling of System 1 and System 2, which
means that pieces of information that reside in working
memory are shared by System 1 and System 2, and there-
fore they could trigger the processes carried out by Sys-
tem 1 and System 2. And then, Mode 1 or Mode 2 takes
over the operation. The shared information originates
from perceptual encodings of the environment.
 Mode 4 (System 1 and System 2 are isolated): In other
cases, System 2 would initiate an independent process
than System 1 is currently engaging. For example, he/
she may use a mobile phone to talk with a friend while
riding a bicycle, in which he/she might think deliberately
to provide topics to enjoy conversation. In this case, his
working memory would be used for two independent pro-
cesses; talking with the friend over phone and riding
bicycle safely. When encountering a dangerous situation,
the system needs to take care of it primarily, which
means that he/she needs to quit the phone conversation
and uses his/her working memory for controlling bicycle.
Switching the part of memory used for the phone call to
the bicycle ride would cause a certain amount of delay in
action. This mode is characterized by isolation of System
1 from System 2, which means that each uses different
portion of working-memory for the respective processes.
System 2 could be either totally detached from System 1,
e.g., daydreaming, or in the deliberate thinking mode
like Mode 2, in which System 2 mainly controls behavior
and System 1 works under the control of System 2 by
using the area of working memory for this process. Mode
3 and Mode 4 are similar because the process System 1
takes control and the one initiated by System 2 are car-s to decision-making and action selection.
d performance, i.e., no serious
ion-making is necessary for most part
havior but still necessary to decide whether continue,
e, or terminate actions, but most part of behavior
e regarded as a series of effortless action selections
lled activities, e.g., learning, thinking, etc.; a series
ious decision-makings will be required
ntrating on skilled activities; shared use of working memory;
to resume to Mode 1 or 2 when necessary
ncentrated activities; Separate use of working memory;
lag in resuming to Mode 1 or 2 activities when necessary
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terms of the usage of working memory, i.e., Mode 3
has the area in working memory that hods information
available to the two processes but Mode 4 does not.
 Mode 2 (System 2 controls behavior):When System 2 gov-
erns behavior, the systems try to behave according to the
image System 2 created or meditate with no bodily move-
ment. The least resources are allocated for initiating
behavior according to input from the environment. This
corresponds to a situation in which the amount of flow
of information in System 1 is small. Working memory is
occupied by activities related to System 2. However,
the sensory-information filter functions so that the sys-
tem can react to a sudden interruption from the environ-
ment (e.g., a phone call).
Mode 1, or System 1 control mode, would require least
cognitive resources for stringing pieces of behavior in the
ever-changing environment. On the other hand, Mode 2,
or System 2 control mode, would consist of resource con-
suming activities including reasoning, recalling weak mem-
ory, etc. System 1 control may break down due to
unexpected change in the environment, which would be de-
tected by System 2’s monitoring activity, leading to System
2 control mode for searching for procedures for escaping
from the undesirable situation. Note that, in daily life, hu-
man beings are normally in System 1 control mode because
human beings normally prefer effortless behavior, but occa-
sionally forced to operate in System 2 control mode for the
purpose of resuming ‘‘normal’’ System 1 control mode as
soon and easily as possible.
3.2.2. Four processing modes of MHP/RT
At a given time, T, MHP/RT’s state is considered from the
viewpoint ‘‘which content of memory MHP/RT is process-Fig. 5 How the four processing modesing.’’ As far as observable behaviors are concerned, human
behavior is considered as a series of moment-by-moment
behavioral selections, either decision-making or action
selection, in the ever-changing environment. Each process
is carried out by System 1 and System 2 of Two Minds under
real time constraints, which basically requires synchroniza-
tion between the workings of System 1 and System 2 in the
real world by taking into account each system’s characteris-
tic times defined by Newell’s time scale of human action
(Fig. 1). The result of behavioral selection is an event, that
includes the direct output of behavior and the resultant
state of the external world.
There are four processing modes:
 System 2 Before Mode: Conscious use of long-term mem-
ory before the event, i.e., System 2’s operation for antic-
ipating the future event, or decision-making.
 System 1 Before Mode: Unconscious use of long-term
memory before the event, i.e., System 1’s operation
for automatic preparation for the future event, or action
selection.
 System 2 After Mode: Conscious use of long-term mem-
ory after the event, i.e., System 2’s operation for reflect-
ing on the past event.
 System 1 After Mode: Unconscious use of long-term
memory after the event, i.e., System 1’s operation for
automatic tuning of long-term memory related with the
past event.
Fig. 5 illustrates the Four Processing Modes along the
time dimension expanding before and after the event,
which is shown as ‘‘boundary event’’ in the figure. Table 3
shows the resultant Four Processing Modes of in situ human
behavior; at each moment along the time dimension human
behaves in one of the four processing modes and he/shework Kitajima and Toyota (2011b).
Table 3 Four processing modes Kitajima and Toyota (2011a).
System 2 conscious processes System 1 unconscious processes
Before After Before After
Time constraints None or weak Exist None or weak Exist
Network structure Feedback Feedback Feedforward + feedback Feedforward
+ feedback
Processing Main serial conscious process +
subsidiary parallel process
Main serial conscious process +
subsidiary parallel process
Simple parallel process Simple
parallel
process
Newell’s time scale Rational/social Rational/social Biological/cognitive Biological/
cognitive
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nal states.
For MHP/RT, an event corresponds to a branch point
where it can select an action from the alternatives under
a specific environmental condition. The environment makes
chaotic changes, and human beings, modeled by MHP/RT,
are requited to develop an adaptive system that is capable
of dealing with a set of events that happen in such an envi-
ronment. An event may result in selection of an action that
is associated with one of four possible action categories, as
defined by four processing modes. An event could be a fu-
ture event or a past event, and it could be processed con-
sciously or unconsciously. These are the four possibilities
when we think about an event along the time dimension.
An action selection will affect the future course of action
selections, and the execution of the selected actions will
change environmental conditions. The mode selection is
carried out empirically. Under the condition of strong time
constraints and the chaotic environment, the results of exe-
cution of selected actions would become unreliable, and it
is required to repair the undesirable situations. In this situ-
ation, flexibility is required in selecting appropriate actions
in response to the unpredictable changes in the environ-
ment. The mechanism of switching among the four process-
ing modes relative to a series of events makes possible the
high level empirical adaptation to the ever-changing
environment.
3.3. The role of memory in MHP/RT
In the diagram of Two Minds depicted by Kahneman (2003),
the memory module is placed rather independently with
System 1 and System 2 as shown by Fig. 1. MHP/RT extends
Two Minds by specifying the role of memory when System 1
and System 2 work (Kitajima & Toyota, 2012c). This is crit-
ical because the contents stored in memory determine what
System 1 and System 2 would do in the ever-changing envi-
ronment, and we are interested in interactions between the
two systems with different characteristic times.
3.3.1. Memory organization
As Fig. 3 illustrates, the memory system operates asynchro-
nously with the systems which are working synchronously
with the environment. Memory processes include storage
of information and usage of stored information. In orderto carry out real time simulation of human decision-making
in daily life, memory processes play very important role.
3.3.2. Memory storage
MHP/RT assumes that memory is organized by ‘‘Multi-
Dimensional Frame’’ for storing information (Fig. 7). MD-
frame is a conceptual extension of Minsky’s frame (Minsky,
1988). It is a primitive cognitive unit that conveys informa-
tion that can be manipulated by brain under various con-
straints, similar to the concept in the ICM (Idealized
Cognitive Model) theory by Lakoff (1987), the schema the-
ory by Rumelhart (1980), and so on. There are three kinds
of MD-frame in MHP/RT. PMD-frame (Perceptual Multidi-
mensional Frame) is created and used by the Perceptual
Information Processing. BMD-frame (Behavior Multidimen-
sional frame) is created and used by the Autonomous Auto-
matic Behavior Control Processing. RMD-frame (Relational
Multidimensional frame) is created and used by the Con-
scious Processing. BMD-frame and RMD-frame are mutually
connected by sharing OBJECT, originated from the Percep-
tual Processing.
3.3.3. Memory usage
Object cognition occurs as follows: collecting information
from the environment via perceptual sensors; integrating
and segmenting the collected information, centering on
visually collected objects; and continuing these processes
until the necessary objects to live in the environment are
obtained. These objects are then used independently in Sys-
tems 1 and System 2 of Two Minds, and memorized after
integrating related entities associated with each system.
Due to the limitation of the brain’s processing capability,
the range of integration is limited; therefore, System 1
memory and System 2 memory may differ. However, they
may share objects originating from perceptual sensors.
Thus, when objects that are the result of the just-finished
integration and segmentation process are processed in the
next cycle, representation of the objects may serve as the
common elements to combine System 1 memory and System
2 memory to form an inter-system memory. We call this
memory the Multi-Dimensional (MD) Frame.
3.3.4. Memory function: Resonance
At a given moment, MHP/RT is working in one of the four
operation modes as described above. However, the memory
Fig. 6 Memory reaction under real time constraints.
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memory active so that it can be used by System 1’s process-
ing and/or System 2’s processing through resonance pro-
cesses. However, as depicted in Fig. 6, how the memory
system should react to the environment may depend on
the degree of time constraints that the human-environment
system should pose on itself. When real time constraints are
strong, slow memory processes that use long-term memory
should not participate in the whole processing. In other
words, only the unconscious side of the Two Minds system,
System 1, should work and have a chance to use memory
through resonance. On the contrary, when there are little
real time constraints, both systems, consciousness and
unconsciousness systems, work collaboratively in some
cases, i.e., Mode 1 and Mode 2, and independently, Mode
3 and Mode 4, in other cases. Both systems would have
chance to use as many resonated contents as possible.
3.3.5. Memory operation: pipelining
As described in 3.2.2, at a given moment, MHP/RT is pro-
cessing contents in one of four types; a future event con-
sciously or unconsciously, or a past event consciously or
unconsciously. For ‘‘future/conscious’’ processing, MHP/
RT uses memory that conveys sequence of actions with sym-
bolic representations for accomplishing a goal that is held at
the moment, for ‘‘future/unconscious’’ processing, it uses
memory that is associated with an automatic sequence of
actions that should lead to the goal, for ‘‘past/conscious’’
processing, it reflects on and elaborate on a certain sym-
bolic event by using activated pieces of knowledge through
resonance processes, and for ‘‘past/unconscious’’ process-
ing, existing memory would be modified by using activated
pieces of knowledge, non-symbolic, that is currently acti-
vated in working memory.
It is important to note that memory activation process is
a totally parallel process, and this means that there is no
way of knowing which part of activated memory is used. It
solely depends on which object MHP/RT is processing.
MHP/RT’s resonance process makes available the relevant
part of activated knowledge through resonance. Along thetime dimension, MHP/RT, working in one of four operation
modes, switches among the four processing modes and uses
activated knowledge through resonance. MHP/RT’s process-
ing is conceived as a pipeline process of four primitive pro-
cesses. Depending on the nature of a task MHP/RT is facing,
the nature of pipelining may change; when learning a new
task, it is impossible to foresee the future, and therefore,
‘‘past/conscious’’ processing may dominate, or deliberate
planning and decision making by inference using information
stored in long-term memory; on the other hand, when an
experienced piano player is playing a well-trained tune,
‘‘future/unconscious’’ processing may dominate.
3.4. Interactions between the future and the past
3.4.1. Event memory creation and utilization
The four processing modes are defined by referring to a sin-
gle event, boundary event. Therefore, it is useful to con-
sider how each of the four processing modes works when
one encounters an event for the first time, and it encounters
the same event in the future.
When one encounters an event for the first time, ‘‘Sys-
tem 1 After’’ processing and/or ‘‘System 2 After’’ process-
ing will work to create encodings of the event as an
experiential memory frame. ‘‘System 2 After’’ processing
will elaborate on the outcome of ‘‘System 1 After’’ process-
ing. Usually, several times of repetition of encountering the
same event will be necessary to establish a cohesive mem-
ory frame.
The experiential memory frame thus created may be
activated before the event happens through ‘‘System 1 Be-
fore’’ processing and/or ‘‘System 2 Before’’ processing. Ac-
tion selection corresponds to ‘‘System 1 Before’’ processing
and decision-making corresponds to ‘‘System 2 Before’’ pro-
cessing. Since the characteristic times of System 1 and
those of System 2 are significantly different, they have dif-
ferent meanings for the behavior to be taken for the event.
As shown in Fig. 8, ‘‘System 2 Before’’ processing, or deci-
sion-making, for the future event will work long before the
event happens when there is time available for collecting
possible actions through deliberate thinking, whereas ‘‘Sys-
tem 1 Before’’ processing, or action selection, for the
immediate future anticipatory event will happen; one will
be able to select action to behave appropriately, not only
experiencing the event but also avoiding the event (not
experiencing the event but an alternative event).
3.4.2. Transition from experiential memory to
prospective memory
An experiential memory frame that ‘‘System 1 After’’ pro-
cessing has created will be converted into an prospective
memory frame, that can be used by ‘‘System 1 Before’’ pro-
cessing for anticipating and preparing for future events.
This conversion process can be automatic when ‘‘System 1
After’’ processing is able to identify the perceptual objects
that are associated with the encoding of the event stored in
the experiential memory frame. For example, when one has
encountered a harmful insect and been stung, he or she
would immediately and automatically establish a link be-
tween the visual and auditory perceptual signals of the in-
sect and the action to drive away the insect by his/her
Fig. 7 Multi-dimensional memory frame.
Fig. 8 Decision-making carried out by ‘‘System 2 Before’’
processing mode and action selection by ‘‘System 1 Before’’
processing mode of MHP/RT.
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quired for identifying the objects that might be useful for
anticipating the event and associating them with perceptual
features of the objects that can be detected by the percep-
tual system before the event happens in the future.
4. Summary: decision-making and action
selection in MHP/RT
In this paper, we showed that MHP/RT would work in one of
four operation modes for dealing with boundary events in
one of four processing modes. In addition, two important
activities for organizing human behavior, i.e., decision-Table 4 MHP/RT’s behavior.
Operation modes Processing modes
System 2 before
Synchronous Mode 1 –
System 1 controls behavior
Rough planning
Synchronous Mode 2 –
System 2 controls behavior
Deliberate planning
and decision-making
Asynchronous Mode 3 –
System 1 and System 2 are weakly
coupled
Thinking things relevant
to the boundary event
Asynchronous Mode 4 –
System 1 and System 2 are isolated
Thinking things irrelevant
to the boundary eventmaking and action selection, are discussed in the entire
space of human behavior defined by the real brain model
MHP/RT. Table 4 summarizes MHP/RT’s behavior. There
are 16 possible combinations generated by the four opera-
tion modes and four processing modes. However, some of
them may not happen. While MHP/RT is working either in
Mode 3 or Mode 4, working memory will not be effectively
used for reflection of the past events for, for example, con-
necting BMD-frame and RMD-frame by sharing OBJECT, orig-
inated from the Perceptual Processing – neither of System 1
After nor System 2 After processing would be initiated con-
cerning the event.
On the other hand, while MHP/RT is working in Mode 1,
which is the normal behavior mode most of the time we
are in, the four processing modes would work coherently
with the state of the ever-changing environment for gener-
ating smooth behavior by appropriately switching among the
four processing modes. However, while MHP/RT is working
in Mode 2, System 2 Before processing would take the high-
est priority among the four processing modes, resulting in
weak reflection in System 2 After processing and weak tun-
ing in System 1 After processing. However, any events, ini-
tially carried out in Mode 2, will be carried out in Mode 1
after a number of practices.
We want to understand a variety of observable human
behaviors in terms of those produced by a cognitive archi-
tecture. This paper focused on decision-making and action
selection that should reside in observable human behaviors,
and showed how they should come in along the humanSystem 1 before System 2 after System 1 after
Action selection Monitoring
System 1’s performance
Tuning
Action selection Weak reflection Weak tuning
Action selection – –
Action selection – –
Decision-making and action selection in Two Minds: An analysis based on Model 93beings’ behavior that should evolve along the time dimen-
sion T in the ever-changing environment.
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